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authorCrist J. Clark <cjc@FreeBSD.org>2002-03-18 02:22:53 +0000
committerCrist J. Clark <cjc@FreeBSD.org>2002-03-18 02:22:53 +0000
commitf51ea5a6dc09ca726b14a65d08ee2496cb81c117 (patch)
tree8cec45bbb7c84f57abf64bb0014b19524fa22395 /chpass/chpass.c
parent18a996f84742152003f9358a7078921d43450ef5 (diff)
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It was possible for an unprivileged user to tie up the password
information (no one else can vipw(8), chpass(1), or even passwd(1)), either on purpose or by accident, until an administrator manually intervened. Instead, do not lock the master.passwd file while a user is editing his information. But once we go to write the new information, check that the modified user's information has not changed in the password database since we started. Abort the changes if it has. Add a $FreeBSD$ to pw_copy.h. PR: i386/35816 Obtained from: NetBSD MFC after: 1 week
Diffstat (limited to 'chpass/chpass.c')
-rw-r--r--chpass/chpass.c49
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/chpass/chpass.c b/chpass/chpass.c
index f10a9d6..86955f6 100644
--- a/chpass/chpass.c
+++ b/chpass/chpass.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ main(argc, argv)
char **argv;
{
enum { NEWSH, LOADENTRY, EDITENTRY, NEWPW, NEWEXP } op;
- struct passwd *pw = NULL, lpw;
+ struct passwd *pw = NULL, lpw, old_pw;
char *username = NULL;
int ch, pfd, tfd;
char *arg = NULL;
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ main(argc, argv)
uid = getuid();
- if (op == EDITENTRY || op == NEWSH || op == NEWPW || op == NEWEXP)
+ if (op == EDITENTRY || op == NEWSH || op == NEWPW || op == NEWEXP) {
switch(argc) {
#ifdef YP
case 0:
@@ -186,6 +186,12 @@ main(argc, argv)
default:
usage();
}
+
+ /* Make a copy for later verification */
+ old_pw = *pw;
+ old_pw.pw_gecos = strdup(old_pw.pw_gecos);
+ }
+
if (op == NEWSH) {
/* protect p_shell -- it thinks NULL is /bin/sh */
if (!arg[0])
@@ -222,31 +228,31 @@ main(argc, argv)
/*
* The temporary file/file descriptor usage is a little tricky here.
- * 1: We start off with two fd's, one for the master password
- * file (used to lock everything), and one for a temporary file.
+ * 1: Create a temporary file called tempname, get descriptor tfd.
* 2: Display() gets an fp for the temporary file, and copies the
* user's information into it. It then gives the temporary file
* to the user and closes the fp, closing the underlying fd.
* 3: The user edits the temporary file some number of times.
- * 4: Verify() gets an fp for the temporary file, and verifies the
- * contents. It can't use an fp derived from the step #2 fd,
- * because the user's editor may have created a new instance of
- * the file. Once the file is verified, its contents are stored
- * in a password structure. The verify routine closes the fp,
- * closing the underlying fd.
- * 5: Delete the temporary file.
- * 6: Get a new temporary file/fd. Pw_copy() gets an fp for it
- * file and copies the master password file into it, replacing
- * the user record with a new one. We can't use the first
- * temporary file for this because it was owned by the user.
- * Pw_copy() closes its fp, flushing the data and closing the
- * underlying file descriptor. We can't close the master
- * password fp, or we'd lose the lock.
- * 7: Call pw_mkdb() (which renames the temporary file) and exit.
+ * The results are stored in pw by edit().
+ * 4: Delete the temporary file.
+ * 5: Make a new temporary file, descriptor tfd.
+ * 6: Get a descriptor for the master.passwd file, pfd, and
+ * lock master.passwd.
+ * 7: Pw_copy() gets descriptors for master.passwd and the
+ * temporary file and copies the master password file into it,
+ * replacing the modified user's record with a new one. We can't
+ * use the first temporary file for this because it was owned
+ * by the user. Pass the new and old user info. Check the
+ * entry for our user has not been changed by someone else by
+ * while the user was editing by comparing the old info to
+ * the entry freshly read from master.passwd. Pw_copy() closes
+ * its fp, flushing the data and closing the underlying file
+ * descriptor. We can't close the master password fp, or we'd
+ * lose the lock.
+ * 8: Call pw_mkdb() (which renames the temporary file) and exit.
* The exit closes the master passwd fp/fd.
*/
pw_init();
- pfd = pw_lock();
tfd = pw_tmp();
if (op == EDITENTRY) {
@@ -262,7 +268,8 @@ main(argc, argv)
(void)unlink(tempname);
} else {
#endif /* YP */
- pw_copy(pfd, tfd, pw);
+ pfd = pw_lock();
+ pw_copy(pfd, tfd, pw, (op == LOADENTRY) ? NULL : &old_pw);
if (!pw_mkdb(username))
pw_error((char *)NULL, 0, 1);